CV

My work focuses on a range of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology, AI, and neuroscience, including perception, mental representation, consciousness, evidence, knowledge, capacities, imagination, and biased algorithms.


Currently my research is focused on issues at the intersection of AI, neuroscience, and philosophy funded by a Guggenheim Award, a Mellon New Directions Fellowship, and a NEH Fellowship. I am working on a series of papers on biased algorithms in AI as well as a book on the neural basis of perception.


The two projects intersect and build on my previous work in perception. In my book The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence (OUP 2018), I develop an integrated account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience that is sensitive to evidence from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and psychophysics. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence—three key features of perception—are each analyzed in terms of one fundamental property: the employment of perceptual capacities. Indeed, a two-word summary of the book is: capacities first. In grounding consciousness, evidence, and content in the physical world, I show how these features of the mind are no less amenable to scientific investigation than any other features of the world. This physicalist view explains how perception is our key to the world while situating perception within that world in all its beauty and complexity. You can find more about my research here.


Selected Publications:

The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018.


“Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity”, Noûs.


“Perceptual Particularity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (1), June 2016, pp. 25-54.


“Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence”, Symposium with comments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz, Philosophical Studies, 173 (4), April 2016, pp. 875-896. (invited)


“Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended: Replies to McGrath, Neta, and Pautz”, Philosophical Studies, 173 (4), April 2016, pp.929-946. (invited)


“The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience”. With a response by Alex Byrne, Philosophical Studies, 170 (1), 2014, pp. 87-100. (invited)


Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion”, Journal of Philosophy, 110 (9), Sept. 2013, pp. 497-517.


Experience and Evidence”, Mind, 122 (487), July 2013, pp. 699-747.


"Perceptual Content Defended", Noûs, 45 (4), Dec. 2011, pp. 714-50.


"Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83 (1), July 2011, pp. 1-40.


"The Situation-Dependency of Perception", Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2), Feb. 2008, pp. 55-84.


"Action and Self-Location in Perception", Mind, 116 (463), July 2007, pp. 603-32.