The Polysemy of 'I'
Mind and Language. (2025)
- De Se Content
- Egocentric Frames of Reference
- First-Person Pronoun
- Perspectives
- Reflexivity
- Self
- Self-Representation
Mind and Language. (2025)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. (2025)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 110 (1): 311-324. (2025)
Co-authored with Andrew Fink, Carl Schoonover, and Mary Peterson
The Relational View of Perception, eds. O. Beck and F. Masrour, pp. 45-82. Routledge. (2025)
Unstructured Content, eds. A. Egan, D. Kindermann, and P. van Elswyck, pp. 201-233. Oxford University Press. (2025)
Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, eds. A. Gupta, O. Beck, and M. Vuletic, pp. 279-289. Springer. (2024)
Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, eds. A. Gupta, O. Beck, and M. Vuletic, pp. 223-249. Springer. (2024)
Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, eds. J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin, pp. 406-430. Wiley-Blackwell. (2023)
Philosophical Studies, 181: 607-616. (2023)
Co-authored with Juan Comesaña
Mind and Language, 37: 235-247. (2022)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100: 744-757. (2020)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100: 715-720. (2020)
Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus, eds. J. Vlastis and K. Vogt, pp. 75-88. Oxford University Press. (2020)
Co-authored with M. Feeney
Analysis, 79 (2): 739-754. (2019)
Analysis, 79 (2): 709-713. (2019)
Noûs, 53 (1): 114-133. (2019)
Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics, eds. S. Gouveia and D. Shottenkirk, pp. 137-169. Routledge. (2019)
Philosophy Compass, 13 (2): 1-16. (2018)
Co-authored with E.J. Green.
Episteme, 14 (3): 311-328. (2017)
Philosophical Perspectives, 31 (1): 409-447. (2017)
Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, eds. R. Borges, C. de Almeida, and P. Klein, pp. 74-95. Oxford University Press. (2017)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (1): 25-54. (2016)
Philosophical Studies, 173 (4): 875-896. (2016)
Symposium with comments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz
Philosophical Studies, 173 (4): 929-946. (2016)
Analysis, 76 (3): 334-345. (2016)
With a response by Christopher Peacocke.
Philosophical Studies, 170 (1): 87-100. (2014)
Does Perception have Content? ed. B. Brogaard. Oxford University Press. (2014)
Mind, 122 (487): 699-747. (2013)
★Abridged version reprinted as “Experience and Evidence Abridged”, Traditional Epistemic Internalism, eds. M. Bergmann and B. Coppenger. Oxford University Press.
Journal of Philosophy, 110 (9): 497-517. (2013)
Philosophical Studies, 163 (1): 49-55. (2013)
With a response by Bill Fish.
Hallucination, eds. F. E. Macpherson and D. Platchias, pp. 291-311. MIT Press. (2013)
Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World, ed. J. Schear. Routledge. (2013)
Synthese, 189 (1): 163-175. (2012)
Noûs, 45 (4): 714-750. (2011)
★Reprinted in Spanish translation as “Una Defensa del Contenido Perceptual”, Experiencia perceptive: Representaxión y Contenido, A Peláez (ed.), translation by E Berumen Covarrubias.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83 (1): 1-40. (2011)
Philosophical Studies, 149 (1): 19-48. (2010)
Perception, Action, and Consciousness, eds. N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer, pp. 145-159. Oxford University Press. (2010)
Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2): 55-84. (2008)
Mind, 116 (463): 603-632. (2007)
The Self-Correcting Enterprise, eds. M. Lance and M. Wolf, pp. 173-196. Rodopi. (2006)
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 48 (5): 780-789. (2000)
Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51: 187-195. (1998)