Papers

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (forthcoming). Co-authored with Andrew Fink, Carl Schoonover, and Mary Peterson.

Comments on Ned Block’s The Border between Seeing and Thinking.

Philosophical Studies, (forthcoming). Co-authored with Juan Comesaña.

Comments on Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100: 715-720. (2020).

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,  100: 744-757. (2020).

Replies to M.G.F. Martin, Casey O’Callaghan, and Michael Rescorla as part of a symposium on The Unity of Perception.

Mind & Language, 37: 235-247. (2022).

Replies to Christopher Hill, Nico Orlandi, and Ram Neta as part of a symposium on The Unity of Perception.

Analysis, 79 (2): 709-713. (2019).

Analysis, 79 (2): 739-754. (2019).

Replies to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen, and Matt McGrath as part of a symposium on The Unity of Perception.

Noûs, 53 (1): 114-133. (2019)

Philosophical Perspectives, 31 (1): 409-447. (2017) Invited.

Episteme, 14 (3): 311-328. (2017) Invited

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (1): 25-54. (2016)

Philosophical Studies, 173 (4): 875-896. (2016) Invited.

Symposium with comments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz

Philosophical Studies, 173 (4): 929-946. (2016) Invited. Part of symposium on my paper “Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence”

Analysis, 76 (3): 334-345. (2016) With a response by Christopher Peacocke. Invited.

Philosophy Compass. Co-authored with E.J. Green.

Mind, 122 (487): 699-747. (2013)

★Abridged version reprinted as “Experience and Evidence Abridged”, Traditional Epistemic Internalism, M. Bergmann and B. Coppenger (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Journal of Philosophy, 110 (9): 497-517. (2013)

Philosophical Studies, 170 (1): 87-100. (2014) Invited.  With a response by Alex Byrne.

Philosophical Studies, selected papers of the Pacific APA 2012, 163 (1): 49-55. (2013) With a response by Bill Fish.

Synthese, special volume edited by R. Briggs, 189 (1): 163-175. (2012) Invited.

Noûs, 45 (4): 714-750.  (2011)

★Reprinted in Spanish translation as “Una Defensa del Contenido Perceptual”, Experiencia perceptive: Representaxión y Contenido, A Peláez (ed.), translation by E Berumen Covarrubias.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83 (1): 1-40. (2011)

Philosophical Studies, 149 (1): 19-48. (2010)

Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2): 55-84. (2008)

Mind, 116 (463): 603-632. (2007)

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 48 (5): 780-789. (2000)

New Waves in Relationalism, eds. O. Beck and F. Masrour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience , eds. A. Gupta, O. Beck and M. Vuletic. Springer: New York, NY. (2024).

Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, eds. A. Gupta, O. Beck and M. Vuletic. Springer: New York, NY. (2024).

Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind,  eds. J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 406-430. (2023).

Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics, ed. S. Gouveia, D. Shottenkirk, London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 137-169.

Unstructured Content, ed. A. Egan, D. Kindermann, and P. van Elswyck, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus, ed. J. Vlastis and K. Vogt, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 75-88.

Co-authored with M. Feeney

Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, ed. R. Borges, C. de Almeida, and P. Klein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 74-95.

Does Perception have Content? ed. B. Brogaard, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Hallucination, ed. F. E. Macpherson and D. Platchias, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013, pp. 291-311.

Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World, ed. J. Schear, London: Routledge, 2013.

Perception, Action, and Consciousness, ed. N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 145-159.

The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars, ed. M. Lance, M. Wolf, Rodopi, 2006, pp. 173-196.

Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51: 187-195. (1998)